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ABSTRACT
The largest agricultural consumer of energy in Colorado is the pumping
of groundwater for irrigation, primarily in the 600,000 acres of pump-irrigated
land overlying the Ogallala aquifer region of eastern Colorado. The Ogallala
formation is a largely non-renewing supply, so the incentives and disincentives
which affect pumping also affect the life and productivity of the aquifer.
This study used computer models of a representative quarter section of
irrigated land to estimate the demand for electricity and pump irrigation water
and to analyze the effects of various rate structures on farm resource alloca-
tion and income. The models wer.eadapted from a linear programming model used
in the Colorado portion of the Ogallala-High Plains Study. Profit-maximizing
behavior was assumed for the operator of a typical irrigation well, which
implies that the user will purchase electricity so long as incremental returns
exceed incremental costs. Seventy-four alternative electricity and water using
production processes are used to represent the irrigators production choices
and resource productivtties.
Crop prices are found to be the most important factor affecting farmer
response to electricity rate structure, so that analysis was performed for
two price scenarios. Using January 1982 crop prices, demands for electricity
and irrigation water were found to be sensitive to electricity prices in the
7 to 9 cent per kilowatt hour (kwh) range, which is in the range of present
average cost. Rate structures using a relatively low hookup charge and higher
energy charge would encourage conservation by causing a shift in the crop mix
from corn to irrigated wheat. Simtl at-l y, single block and increasing block
rate structures encourage less irrigation than the more prevalent declining
block rate structures. The model predicted farm income to remain relatively
stable with conversion to less energy intensive crops, but this result came
at the expense of utility revenues.
Seasonal rate structures~ which incorporate discounts of up to 30 percent
for off-peak energy use, did not shift predicted peak demands under either
price scenario. (Load management programs were not tested.)
The demands for electricity and water for irrigation were much more in-
elastic under the 1977-1981 average crop price scenario. These relative - :< r;
prices were about 25 percent higher (in real terms) than the 1982 price
scenario. Rate structures would have less impact on farm resource use~ should
commodity prices again rise to that level. If these low prices were expected
to persist, model forecasts imply a rather substantial decline in electricity
demand from irrigators.
The principal policy recommendation is a call for change in the form of
sharply declining rate blocks. Concern is raised that the last block reached
by most customers does not meet the long-run incremental costs of providing
energy and that the user cost of Ogallala water is ignored. An increasing
block rate structure ending at long-run marginal cost of acquiring additional
electricity offers the advantages of meeting revenue requirements and increasing
conservation incentives. Allocative efficiency could be improved to a lesser
degree by the alternative of lowering hookup charges and using single block
or very gradually declining block rate structures. Allowing electric coopera-
tives to average irrigation revenue over several years would facilitate the
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INTRODUCTION
Energy, water, and agriculture are each important public concerns in
Colorado. The largest agricultural consumption of energy in Colorado is
for the extraction of groundwater for irrigation, particularly in eastern
Colorado. There, water is pumped to irrigate about 600,000 acres of land.
The water is withdrawn from the Ogallala aquifer, an ancient deposit of
saturated sands and gravels underlying a large portion of the High Plains.
The aquifer is recharged by precipitation to only a small extent, so the
i ncenti ve and di s i ncenti ve forces whi ch govern wi thdrawa1 affect the
potential life of the resource.
Public policy, in the case of regulated industries such as the elec-
trical utilities, can influence the level and form of prices (rates) charged
to consumers. Any particular combination of rate level and rate form is
referred to as a "rate structure." The structure of charges to energy users
can affect consumption patterns and has an impact on whether users conserve
the resource or use it wastefully. For example, a structure for which the
marginal charge is low encourages consumption, whereas -a rate with a high
marginal charge can promote conservation. Since the energy consumed is used
to pump and apply water for irrigation, there is a direct link between energy
prices and water use. Rate structure changes are hypothesized to influence
the date of the aquifer's exhaustion. Even small differences in aquifer life
will be important to individuals and communities directly affected.
Natural gas and electricity prices, in addition to groundwater regulations,
commodity prices, and interest rates, are among the most important factors
affecting the future of irrigation in the High Plains. These two sources of
energy are used in 98 percent of all Colorado High Plains irrigation. The
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deregulation of natural gas is expected to increase its price substantially
in the region over the next 10 years. Because of this and because electric
motors are generally less costly to maintain and repair than natural gas
engines, electricity is expected to be the dominant source of irrigation power
in the future.
The effective price of electricity for irrigation is determined by two
factors: the rate structure and the hookup charge. The rate structure speci-
fies the charges per kilowatt hour (kwh) in each block of energy used. In a
declining block ·rate costs per kwh are highest for the first block of power
used, and less for each successive block. Much of Colorado High Plains irri-
gation powered by electricity is now under a declining rate structure. Several
rural electric associations (REAs) in the region are considering adopting
a single block structure that will charge the same amount per kwh regardless
of the amount used.
In addition to costs from the rate structure, a charge may be made for
each motor that is hooked up to the system. A charge of $20 per horsepower
per year is typical, so the hookup charge for a 100-horsepower motor is
$2000 a year -- before a single kwh of energy is used. Add in the cost of
actual power use -- $7000 per year for a center pivot system irrigating
130 acres is typical -- and the total annual bill can be $9000 per circle
or $70 an acre.
The combination of declining block rates and high hookup charges provide
less incentive for either energy or water conservation than do alternative
structures. Under these pricing policies, the last kwh used costs much less
than the first, and so the last acre inch of water applied also costs less
than the first. This encourages farmers to raise crops that require more water.
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From the utility company's perspective, these pricing policies were
developed to insure sufficient revenue to cover fixed costs associated with
power plant and transmission systems. These policies have worked well to
provide revenue in the face of uncertain future electricity use. Under these
policies, a relatively large amount of revenue is generated from initial hook-
up fees and initial uses of power, since the first block is the most expensive
per unit. In this way, utilities have some protection against the possibility
of major declines in electricity usage. Unfortunately for irrigators, if
total energy use in the region begins to decline, utilities will have to
increase their hookup charges. per kwh annuallY to maintain revenues, and the
"reward" for saving energy could-be a rate increase.
The pricing policies of electric utilities -- local REAs -- have an
important effect on energy and water use efficiency and on the life of the
Ogallala aquifer. It will be difficult to balance the interests of all parties
involved: irrigators want cheaper energy so they can continue to irrigate;
utilities need sufficient revenue to supply electricity; and all citizens of
the region have a stake in sustaining the economic life of the aquifer.
Objective and Plan of Study
The policy issue with which this study is concerned is: What electricity
rate structure policies for pump irrigation are in the long-term interests of
the suppliers, the users, and the public? Economic analysis cannot provide
the entire answer to this question . However, forecasts of the impacts of
alternative rate structures on energy consumption, water use, farm production,
and net income will provide valuabl~ insights to aid in rate structure deci-
sions. The purpose of this study is to provide conceptually sound and factually-
based forecasts of these impacts. We are aware of no previous study explicitly
directed to the role of rate structures in pump irrigation economies.
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The following section provides some theoretical background on rate struc-
ture analysis and the demand for electricity. Then the model used in the
analysis, which was adapted from the previous research of the Ogallala High
Plains Study, is described in detail.
The analytic approach is most easily explained as a set of computer
modelling experiments which isolate different aspects of rate structures.
First, an empirical demand curve for electricity for irrigation is derived
from the model, assuming the adoption of a single block rate. Then the effects
of varying the proportions between the hookup charge and a single block are
examined. Variations in declining block rate structures are the next topic
studied. Finally, a seasonal rate structure with a winter discount is modeled.
The results of this research, combined with utility pricing theory, are then




In this section, we briefly dicuss the criteria for rate structure
evaluation, review several common rate forms, and develop the concepts of
demand and cost which are utilized in the subsequent analysis.
Criteria for Evaluating Rate Structures
Several criteria can be used to evaluate rate structures, including
allocative efficiency, revenue sufficiency, equity, ability to pay, and
resource conservation [Hirshleifer, DeHaven, and Milliman, 1960J.
Allocative Efficiency
The most important criterion for the purpose of this study is that of
lIallocativell or lIeconomicll efficiency. This criterion is concerned with
attaining maximum net value of product from the economy1s scarce resources,
given the level of technology and preferences of consumers. Economic effi-
ciency is obtained when the marginal price to the consumer is equal to the
marginal cost of producing an extra unit of the commodity (so-called II mar gi nal
cost pricing ll); maximum net returns are achieved. The rational consumer will
limit purchases to the level where the net benefit of the last unit of elec-
tricity just equals the cost of supplying that unit. Any consumption less
than this point has marginal value greater than cost, so that such an output
level is less than optimal. Similarly, consumption in excess of the point
of equality of incremental benefit and incremental cost implies that cost
exceeds value of the margin, which is wasteful of resources. (This concept




The main yardstick by which rate structures for public utilities have
historically been measured is their ability to raise enough revenue so as to
meet operating costs, provide an adequate return on capital, and thereby ren-
der the utility financially self-sufficient [Gardner, 1977J.
Equity
Another traditional belief is that rate structures should be set so as
to reco.ver the full cost of the commodity from the user. Sometimes called the
Jlbeneficiary principle," this criterion views the payment of part of the costs
of serving one user group by charging another group more or by the general
taxpayer as inequitable. Discrimination in the charges to different customer
groups is regarded as equitable only if the cost of service varies between
or among the groups [Turvey, 1971].
Abi 1ity to Pay
A criterion often in direct conflict with the one just described would
differentiate according to wealth and/or income, such that low income groups
would pay less per unit than the financially better off. "Lifeline" rates
for the elderly or the poor is a well-known example. The level of the con-
sumer's ability to pay must be set by a subjective judgment on the part of
the regulatory authority, since there is no known objective rule for such
cases.
Resource Conservation
In an ideal economy, where all commodities and services are priced at
their incremental cost, where the future is fully known and interest rates
reflect the appropriate discount of future consumption against present
usage, the price system would serve to conserve resources and allocate them
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optimally through time. However, in a real world in which groundwater is un-
priced and there exists a suspicion that the true scarcity value of fossil
fuels and the external costs associated with their combustion are not fully
reflected in fuel prices, some observers have looked to electricity rate
structures as a means of encouraging conservation of unpriced or improperly
priced water and energy resources. The effective price of scarce resources
should ideally include the lI user cost,1I which is the present value of oppor-
tunity cost of sacrifices imposed on future users by consumption in the
present . [Howe, 1979] .
Resolving Conflicting Criteria
The criteria described above are at times in conflict. However, ready
resolution may be found in some cases, while others require social or political
decisions on appropriate tradeoffs.
Perhaps the most widely described conflict is between allocative efficiency
and the revenue requirement. In the case of decreasing costs, marginal cost
will be below average cost at the preferred level of output, so that marginal
cost price will fail to satisfy the revenue requirement. In such event, a
service charge reflecting fixed costs or higher rates for the first units of
electricity, combined with rates reflecting marginal costs of subsequent
consumption will satisfy both criteria [Berg, et al., 1976J. The equity
objective is also satisfied by two-part pricing systems of this sort, since
the full cost of electricity supply is paid for by the user.
Common Rate Forms
Only general statements about rate forms need be made at the outset.
(See Taylor [1975J for a particularly detailed review of alternative rate
forms and their impacts.)
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Flat Charge
Under this rate form, each customer pays one total price for any amount
of electricity consumed. There is no limit to the amount used. There is also
no incentive to conserve electricity because the marginal cost of consuming
another unit is zero. This rate form is used for municipal water or sewer




















Figure 1. Total Electricity Bill and Average Prices - Flat Charge
Single Block
Here the price per unit of electricity is constant no matter how much
electricity is consumed. Total cost to the consumer increases with consumption,
so there is an incentive to conserve. Since there is only one price, this in-
centive remains constant. If the single block is set to match marginal cost,
this rate form can be both efficient and nondiscriminatory. Varying costs
for different consumer classes means a variety of single block rates, however.
Of course, there must be some sort of metering system to measure consumption.
(See iFigure 2)
Declining Blocks
The price per unit in this rate form decreases in a stepwise manner with






























Quantity Consumed Quantity Consumed
Figure 2. Total Electricity Bill and Marginal and Average Prices:
Single Block
specified quantity of electricity and lower prices for succeeding units of
consumption. The total cost increases, but at a decreasing rate. (See Figure
3) Since incremental costs fall with increasing consumption, the ..tncent ive to

























Figure 3. Declining Block Rates
The rate levels that are attached to the declining form are very important.
If all customers reach the lowest price and it is set at marginal cost, this
rate form can also be efficient. The higher rate blocks would then serve
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only to capture enough consumer's surplus from inframarginal consumption to
meet revenue requirements and would not affect resource allocation. However,
if the first blocks are set above marginal cost so as to allow later blocks
to be below marginal cost, declining blocks encourage overuse of electricity.
Increasing Blocks
This is the opposite of declining blocks in that the price per unit
increases in a stepwise fashion with the amount purchased. The total cost
of electricity increases at an increasing rate. (See Figure 4) The incentive
to conserve increases as higher rate levels are reached. When the cost of
new generating capacity is large, this rate form can be used to discourage
peak demands. If the last block1s rate equals long-run marginal cost, in-
creasing block rates can be efficient in allocation and avoid a short-run
revenue surplus. It is also the rate form proposed as "lifeline" rates,






































Several of the above forms may be given added refinement by adding
variations in level (and form) with respect to time. This may vary between
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seasonal structures, which shift two or more times yearly, to day of week
shifts, to hourly shifts. These types are termed "peak-load pricing ll systems,
and are often advocated as rationing mechanisms for periods of high general
energy demand [Wenders, 1976; Crockett, 1976J. Such structures require a
much more sophisticated means of measuring energy quantity. Meters with
the necessary capabilities are being rapidly perfected and are not at all
infeasible in the current and anticipated state of technology.
The Demand for Electricity and the Marginal Cost of Acquiring It
To facilitate analysis of farmer behavior under different rate structures,
additional economic concepts are introduced. The principles of supply and
demand provide decisions rules regarding the amount of electricity a rational,
profit-maximizing farmer will purchase.
Consider the simple resource allocation model in Figure 5. The demand
curve shows the amount of a good that an individual would purchase at varying
prices. The curve is downward sloping because the price one is willing to
pay decreases as quantity increases. The horizontal line shows the price
(P) at which unlimited quantities of the good are available. It is labeled
MC for the marginal cost of acquiring another unit. In more realistic ex-
amples, marginal cost need not be constant or horizontal.
In the short run, the marginal cost curve is also the supply curve for
the good. Thus, the intersection of marginal cost with demand at A illus-
trates the familiar economic principle: supply equals demand at the optimum
quantity. If the example represents a f'armer ' s demand for electricity for
irrigation, then he purchases Q kwh at a price P per kwh. The farmer does
not purchase more than Q because he is not willing to pay the marginal cost
of acquiring it. Nor does he purchase less than Q units because those units
















Figure 5. A Simple Resource Allocation Model.
represents willingness to pay, the farmer has actually reaped excess benefit
in the amount of the triangle PDA from this transaction. This area under
the demand curve but above the cost paid is called consumer surplus. The
farmer p~id an amount equal to the rectangle PAQO which becomes revenue to
the producer of electricity. (In the case under study, electricity is an
input to a production process -- a producer's good -- and is represented by
the Value of Marginal Product (VMP). The surplus in this instance represents
the producertsprnf'tt [Heady, 1952J.)
In the case of electricity, the fixed costs of investments in power
generation and transmission facilities are often much larger than the oper-
ating cost of producing power. In an attempt to cover these costs, utilities
often assess a hookup or demand charge to irrigators prior to delivery of
a single kwh. Since the farmer can purchase as much electricity as he likes,
and the utility must maintain extra capacity for that contingency, the hook-
up charge can be viewed as the price of the privilege of entering the market
[Hirsh1eifer, et a1., 1960J.
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A hookup charge can be construed as taking from the farmers' surplus.
As long as this fixed charge is less than the consumer surplus generated
by planned consumption, theoretically, it will not affect a farmer's irriga-
tion decisions. However, if the hookup charge does exceed the surplus, the
farmer won't irrigate at all. These two cases are illustrated in Figures 6a
and 6b. One should remember that demand curves will vary among farms, due to
productivity differences, so that a particular rate structure might cause some












Figure 6a. Single Block Rate with
Hookup Charge
Figure 6b. Single Block Rate with
Excessive Hookup Charge
Another pricing strategy used by electric utilities instead of a hookup
charge is to charge higher rates for the first kilowatt hours and then make
successive consumption cheaper. This is, of course, the declining block rate
structure, and its aim is to pay fixed costs by capturing a part of the con-
sumer surplus through the variable charge [Crockett, 1976J. Figure 7a shows
that the effect is to change the marginal cost curve. It is now discontinuous
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in that a higher price applies until the end of that block is reached at Ql'
whereupon the next lower price is used for the next unit. It is theoretically
possible to construct a rate structure, such as in Figure 7b, which takes away
most of the consumer surplus, yet still does not affect user decisions. This
would maximize utility revenues. In practice, however, the variations in
consumer demand and the uncertainties in estimating demand makes this type
of rate structure very risky. It might result in a situation as shown in
Figure 7c where a block crosses the demand curve, creating multiple optimal
solutions. A rational farmer might purchase Q* units, or he might purchase
out to Q** if his consumer surplus covers the area where costs exceed demand.


























Thus, it can be seen that the most important variable in a rate structure
is the marginal cost at the point where demand is intersected. This factor
determines the amount of electricity purchased. Provided there is sufficient
surplus to cover the hookup charge and there are no multiple solutions, the
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number of blocks and the way they change will not affect the behavior of users
of electricity.
It should be noted that the term marginal cost in this discussion has
referred to the marginal cost facing the consumer for purchasing another unit.
This marginal cost is determined by the rate structure, which is easily changed.
The most efficient allocation of resources will occur if the relevant marginal
cost is also the marginal cost to the utility of producing that unit (though
there is debate whether this should be short-run or long-run marginal cost.
See Turvey [1971J or Saunders, Warford, and Mann [1977J). A declining block
structure could still be efficient if its last block reflected the utility·s
marginal cost and was attained by all customers. As Cowing [1980J states
To summarize our discussion, the efficiency condition for optimal
rate structures requires that the price in the last or marginal
block be set equal to marginal cost, and that inframarginal prices
be set neither so high that some consumers are forced out of the
market nor so low that the firm cannot meet its allowed revenue
requirements.
Finally, some mention should be made of factors which cause individual
demands to differ and others which shift all demand curves. The demand by
a farmer for an input such as electricity for pump irrigation is conceptually
given by the value of the marginal product (VMP) of that input. An input
will be used by the rational farmer until the VMP equals the input price.
The VMP, of course, varies with the crop or crop mix grown and with soils
and climate. The productivity of water depends, too, upon the levels of all
the other inputs in the production process. Fertilizer and pesticide appli-
cations are examples. Management skills such as tillage practices and irri-
gation timing also affect the value of the marginal product of an input.
Some economic and physical factors cause a shift in all users' demands
for an input. Crop prices affect the value of the marginal product of all
inputs used on the farm. Similarly, changes in the price of other inputs
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will affect pump irrigation levels. Falling aquifer levels increase the amount
of energy needed to pump and thereby 'rai se water costs. Thus, anyone, or a
combination of, lower crop prices, higher prices for other inputs, or lower
aquifer levels could cause the demand shift portrayed in Figure 8 which caused
a reduction in electricity use from Ql to Q2. While the following sections
use increases in electricity prices to show farmer reactions, and hold all
other factors constant, it is important to know that the effect could also
have been brought by a change or changes in these other factors as well.
Ppo-------'lr------>y-----
Quantity
Ftqure 8. A Downward Shift in the Demand for Electricity
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THE ANALYTIC MODEL AND THE STUDY AREA
To analyze the effects of various rate structures, the reactions of an
economically rational High Plains farmer growing a typical irrigated crop
mix with an average well are examined. The crop mix may be changed within
allowable limits (determined by market or agronomic considerations) or less
water and other inputs may be applied so that profits are maximized under
each rate structure. A static linear programming model assesses these re~
actions.
The model builds upon a just-completed study of the long-term outlook
for the six-state Ogallala aquifer region, supported by the U.S. Department
of Commerce and the various state governments. The Colorado portion of this
Ogallala-High Plains Study developed models to forecast energy and water
demands in six subareas of eastern Colorado [Young, et al., 1982J.
The crop budgets were based on a farm survey which was conducted by
L. R. Conklin in the fall of 1979 to determine actual resource use, resource
organization, and farming practices in the region. A random sample of 86
farm operators was interviewed. A linear programming model which optimizes
returns to land and management was then constructed to simulate farmers'
crop growing decisions for normal production practices, yields, and input
and crop prices. (See Appendix 1 for a partial tableau of the model.)
While the model used here is thus based on reported 1979 farming prac-
tices, production technologies are not thought to have changed appreciably.
Input prices were updated to January 1982 [Conklin, 1982J. Many input prices
are reported for Colorado in the USDA publication, Agricultural Prices. In
cases where prices were not specifically reported, an updated price was com-
puted using the appropriate component of the USDA IIIndex of Prices Paid by
Farmers. II Seed and fertilizer prices were confirmed with retail suppliers.
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Crop prices were also updated to a five-year average price expressed in 1982
dollars. However, since crop prices are so influential to the model results,
and since commodity prices have fallen considerably the last two years, many
of the tests were repeated using January 1982 crop prices for sensitivity
analysis. Table 1 contains the resulting commodity and input prices, as well
as normal yield assumptions.
Tab1e 1. Commodi ty Pri ces , Vi e1ds , and Input Pri ces for Suba rea 5 of
the Ogallala Aquifer Region, Colorado.
Six crops were included in the model: sugar beets, pinto beans, corn,
wheat, sorghum, and alfalfa. It is assumed that these crops can be grown with
any of t~ree different irrigation systems: furrow irrigation employing gated
pipe, or center pivot sprinklers using either conventional high pressure or
low pressure nozzle systems. The crop could also be irrigated at IIfull ll levels,
as measured by the farm survey and expert opinion, or at reduced application
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rates of five-sixths, two-thirds, or one-third of full irrigation. (Wheat,
however, was not differentiated to allow the five-sixths irrigation level.)
This detail in the model allows more precise estimation of electricity and
water demand. Dryland crop production was another option for all crops ex-
cept sugar beets. The model therefore contains 74 crop activities.
Production conditions vary across the Colorado Ogallala. Time and
resource limits precluded an investigation of all possible conditions, so
the Burlington area was chosen for this case study. This subarea has rea-
sonably homogeneous medium-textured soils, and includes the southeastern
portion of Yuma County and eastern Kit Carson and Cheyenne Counties (see
Figure 9). It is an area of low relative humidity and abundant sunshine
with an average growing season exceeding 150 days. Average annual rainfall
is 15 to 16 inches, but it is highly variable in timing and amount. Soils
are generally loams or silt loams, and elevations range around 4,000 feet.
Extensive irrigation began in the 1960's with surface irrigation or row
crops. Center pivots have been installed during the 1970's where topography
discouraged surface irrigation. In parts of this area, the cost of pumping
water has already dictated an increase in the acreage of crops less water-
intensive than corn, such as small grains and pinto beans.
The model is based on the average well depth for the area in 1979 and
the average irrigated area per well of 128 acres. Average 1979 pump lift
(or depth to water plus drawdown) was 158 feet, and total dynamic head (TDH)
was computed by the following formula:
TDH = Pump Lift + Column/Pump Head Friction + (2.31 ft/psi x
Operating Pressure) + Elevation Head
where: Column/pump head friction = 12 feet,
Operating pressure = 5 psi for gated pipe,
40 psi for low pressure sprinkler,
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Elevation head = 0 for gated pipe,
10 feet for low or high pressure sprinkler.
The total dynamic heads computed by this procedure and used in the model were
180 feet for gated pipe surface irrigation, 270 feet for low pressure sprinkler,
and 350 feet for high pressure sprinkler operations. The model's estimates for
electricity and water demand are thus for a hypothetical average well or quarter-
section.
By the nature of linear programming, the most profitable activity would
tend to be selected exclusively for maximum farm profits. Some constraints
were necessary to simulate to a degree at least the physical and economic
limitations that dictate the present farm operation mix. Since surface irri-
gation cannot be installed on sloping fields, gated pipe systems were limited
to a maximum of half the irrigated area. Similarly, low pressure sprinkler
irrigation was limited to half the acreage because this technology is not
suited to heavy soils. Because of soils considerations, at least one-fourth
of the land was forced to remain under conventional high pressure center pivot
sprinklers as long as irrigation remained feasible.
Crop constraints were also considered necessary for sugar beets and pinto
beans. These crops are the most profitable, but their limited markets pre-
vent expansion of these crops to ' large areas. Sugar beets and pinto beans
were therefore constrained in the model to the proportion of the crop mix
they represent in Yuma and Kit Carson Counties, or about 5 percent each.
Finally, this model incorporates a medium-run planning horizon. It is
not short-run because machinery fixed costs are included in the farm budgets
in addition to variable input costs. However, a return to land, managerial
skills, and irrigation systems costs are not included in the model. A separate
test is therefore made for long-run irrigation feasibility by subtracting the
opportunity cost of land (measured by returns to dryland wheat production),
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management costs of 6 percent of gross returns, and the annualized irrigation
system investment cost from net income. The irrigation system cost is an
average of gated pipe and center pivot system costs weighted by the existing
proportions in subarea 5. The $78,100 system investment is amortized at 6
percent real interest for 20 years and amounts to $51 per acre per year.
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THE ESTIMATED DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY AND IRRIGATION WATER
Demand curves for electricity and irrigation water were estimated by
first solving the model with a single block rate structure. The price of
electricity was varied from 2 to 50 cents per kwh, while all other prices
were held constant. Five year average, inflation-adjusted, commodity prices
were used first.
Resource Demand with 1977-81 Averaqe Prices
Demand for Electricity
As illustrated in Figure 10, the demand for electricity is a stepped
function of its price as is characteristic of linear programming results.
A particular crop mix might remain the most profitable as electricity in-
creases in price until a new configuration maximizes net income. Thus, over
short shifts in price, the demand curve appears to be inelastic, then highly
elastic. In reality, the aggregate response to price would be more gradual
both because individual farmers with differing production conditions would
react at different price levels and because a diversified crop mix is pre-
ferred to sudden massive shifts.
The most pertinent characteristic of this empirical demand curve is that
it is highly inelastic within the relevant price range. Price elasticity is
only -0.019 in the range from 1.3 to 14.8 cents, meaning that a 1 percent in-
crease in price would reduce consumption of electricity by only 0.019 percent.
Since the blocks of nearly all rate structures fall within this range, this
is an early indication that rate structures may not have a large effect on
farmers at current electricity prices and average crop prices. However, at
prices exceeding 14.8 cents per kwh, the demand for electricity is quite
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Figure 10. Estimated ' Demand Per Well for Electricity for .Pump Irrigation with 1977-81
AverageComnodity Prices.
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"Cross" Demand for Water
For any price of electricity, there are three costs of irrigation water
due to the differing pumping requirements for the three irrigation systems.
A conventional demand function using the cost of irrigation water is there-
fore difficult to construct. However, by varying the price of electricity
and measuring the quantity of water demanded, a "crossll demand curve for
irrigation water based on the price of electricity can be derived. Since
the price of irrigation water varies directly with the price of electricity,
the latter serves as a proxy for a price per acre foot of water.
It is not surprising that the cross demand curve (Figure 11) has the
same stepped slope as the demand for electricity. Again the demand for irri-
gation water is extremely inelastic in the current price range of 1.3 to 16
cents. In fact, this portion of the demand curve for water actually has a
small range which is somewhat backward bending and has a positive cross-price
elasticity. This is due to the substitution of surface irrigation for
sprinkler irrigation. Surface irrigation requires more water to be applied,
but due to the low pressurization, less electricity is actually required.
The demand curve does return to normal shape in the more elastic portion above
16 cents per kwh.
"Breakeven" Electricity Price
An examination of the IIbreakevenll prices for the crops included in the
linear program does much to explain the stepped form of the demand functions.
Breakeven prices of electricity show the level at which crops are no longer
profitable and are eliminated from production.
Two breakeven prices were calculated. The short-run breakeven price
shows the price of electricity which could be paid to irrigate a crop after
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Figure 11. Estimated Cross Demand Per Well for Irrigation Water with Respect to the
Price of Electricity Using 1977-81 Average Commodity Prices.
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the user cost of water have been paid. It is not truly a short-run price
because the fixed cost of farm machinery is included. However, it does show
the level below which farmers who own their land will keep irrigating until
they must replace their irrigation equipment. (Because this is an economic
and not a financial analysis, farmers who are highly leveraged at high inter-
est rates will not break even at the rates found in Table 2.) By including
a payment for the irrigation system and management cost, a long-run breakeven
price is found. Below that price farmers will keep irrigating as long as
crop prices stay at average levels. (See Appendix 2 for further detail.)
Table 2 shows the highest short-run and long-run IIbreakeven ll points
for each of the crops analyzed. There are several interesting points here.
First, gated pipe surface irrigation most commonly has the highest breakeven
price. The electricity savings from not pressurizing the water apparently
outweigh the higher water requirements of surface irrigation.
Table 2. Maximum IIBreakeven ll Electricity Rates Using 1977-81 Average Commodity
Prices.
Irrigation Irrigation Breakeven Rate ¢/kwh
Crop System Level Short Run a Long Runb
Pinto Beans Gpc One-third 63.1 23.4
GP Two-thirds 60.0 38.1
Sugar Beets GP Two-thirds 44.5 30.2
GP Five-sixths 43.9 31 .7
Corn Gra in GP Five-sixths 26.6 14.7
GP Full 25.1 14.8
Wheat GP Two-thirds 29.1 7. 1
LPCpd Two-thirds 28.5 9.5
Grain Sorghum GP Two-thirds 13.7 e
Alfalfa GP Full 12.5 6.5
~Returns to land, management, irrigation system, and water.
cReturns to land and water.
dGated pipe surface irrigation.
Low pressure center pivot.
eUnprofitab1e at any electricity rate.
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shifts in relative crop prices. Such price effects would slow the transition
to other crops. For instance, a large change from corn to irrigated wheat
would tend to depress wheat prices while allowing the price of corn to rise.
Another impediment in this case is that corn and wheat have overlapping growing
seasons unless corn is cut for silage. This commonly means that another crop
like pinto beans must be grown in a transition year. Given the low current
price of beans, the transfer costs of a corn-to-wheat switch are increased.
Sensitivity to Lower Crop Prices
The resource demand functions which are important in determining the
effect of rate structures would be shifted by changed crop prices. Crop prices
which existed in early 1982 were substantially below those which reflected
the 1977-81 conditions (see Table 1). Therefore, the model was reformulated
and solved with January 1982 commodity prices to test sensitivity to lower
crop prices. The demand curves for electricity and water and breakeven prices
were again estimated.
Electricity and Water Demand -- Low Prices
As might be expected, the entire demand curve for electricity shifted
inward with lower crop prices; less power is purchased at any price level
(see Figure 12). It is especially important to note that a very elastic por-
tion of the demand curve, where irrigated corn shifts to irrigated wheat,
now occurs in the 7 to 9 cent per kwh range. This range encompasses the
present average cost of power, so that electricity consumption could fall
sharply were single block pricing at long-run marginal cost adopted.
Figure 13 shows that very similar demand and electricity estimates hold
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Figure 12. Estimated Demand Per Well for Electricity for Pump Irrigation in Eastern
Colorado Using January 1982 Commodity Prices.
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"Breakeven ll Analysis -- Low Prices
The results of the breakeven analysis for 1982 prices are shown in Table
3. The breakeven rate for pinto beans fell so dramatically as to make other
crops more profitable and eliminate beans from the crop mix. Sugar beets
also leave before irrigated wheat with 1982 crop prices. While the short-run
breakeven rate for corn is 13.8 cents per kwh, wheat becomes more profitable
in the 7 to 9 cent per kwh range as shown in the demand curves. Wheat's
short-run breakeven price of 23.1 cents per kwh explains the second elastic
portion of the demand curve.




Short Runa Long Run bCrop System Level
Pinto Beans LPCpc Full 7.7 e
Sugar Beets Gpd Full 16.3 7.3
Corn Grain LPCP Full 14.3 6.8
Wheat LPCP Two-thirds 24.3 5.7
Grain Sorghum GP Two-thirds 3.0
Al fa 1fa GP Full 9.6 3.8
aReturns to land, management, irrigation system, and water.
bReturns to land and water.
~Low pressure center pivot.
Gated pipe surface irrigation.
eUnprofitable at any electricity rate.
The long-run breakeven rates show a dismal outlook if prices were to
persist at or below the levels of early 1982. Current average power costs
of 7.8 cents per kwh will force irrigated agriculture in eastern Colorado out
of business in the long run if commodity prices do not improve.
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Comparison to Previous Studies
The demand curves for electricity and irrigation water and corresponding
elasticity estimates reported above generally fit quite well with past research.
Adams, Lacewell, and Condra [1976J used a short run, parametric linear program-
ming model to generate demand curves for irrigation water on the Texas High
Plains with two levels of commodity prices. Their stepped demand functions
were very similar to the ones reported here, exhibiting first inelastic and
then very elastic portions. Bowen and Young [1982J used a linear programming
model to demonstrate that the demand for irrigation water in Egypt is very
inelastic in the current price range.
A short-run price elasticity of demand for electricity for pump irrigation
in the Pacific Northwest was estimated at -0.3. Whittlesey, et ale [1981J
found elasticities of -0.66, -0.66, and -1.08 for long-run price shifts of
0-100 percent, 100-200 percent, and 200-400 percent of current prices. The
short-run and 0-100 percent long-run elasticity estimates are higher than those
for Colorado. Perhaps the low current prices for electricity in the Pacific
Northwest mean that low cost improvements in irrigation efficiencies are
available when price increases.
Christensen, Morton, and Heady [1981, p. 32] examined price elasticities
for irrigation surface and groundwater with a national model and found that
"groundwater is more sensitive to its own price changes than is surface water. II
In contrast to surface water, groundwater arc price elasticities showed highly
elastic areas where the elasticity exceeds 1.5, especially when groundwater
prices were doubled and tripled. (Our demand curves for eastern Colorado that
used 1982 crop prices showed a similar pattern.)
Ayer and Hoyt [1981] estimated the price elasticity for irrigation water
on different soil textures and for specific crops in Arizona. Demand was
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generally inelastic, but in all cases the elasticity increased both as the
price of water increased from $.50 to $5 per acre inch and as the crop price
decreased. The same pattern was discovered by Kelly and Ayer [1982J for the
price elasticity of demand for irrigation water in California for corn and
cotton. Elasticity estimates were generally less than -0.3. Shumway [1973J
found the long-run elasticity for irrigation water on the west side of the
San Joaquin Valley rose from -0.48 at $4 per acre foot to -2.03 at $17 per
acre foot.
Maddigan, Chern, and Rizy -est imat ed short- and long-run price elasticities
of electricity for irrigation of -1.081 and -2.123 through an econometric
approach. These elasticities are perhaps higher than reported elsewhere, but
they apply to the entire Central Region, which is characterized by numerous
shallower wells in Nebraska, and by greater average rainfall than experienced
in the Colorado portion of the Ogallala. Their econometric procedure computes
an average demand across the observed range of prices, which smoothes out the
steps which are characteristic of the linear programming approach.
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RATE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
This section individually examines several different aspects of rate
structures and their effects on pump irrigation.
Experiment I. Hookup Versus Energy Charges
This first experiment investigates variation in the proportions of
hookup versus energy charges, i.e., fixed versus variable costs to the farmer.
Different rate structures could be designed to yield the same utility
revenue with many combinations of high hookup charge and low energy charges
or low hookup charge and higher energy rate. Five such equivalent rate struc-
tures were modeled using the Kit Carson Electric Association's 1981 irrigation
rate structure and their latest cost of service study [Tynes, 1981, 1982J.
This rate structure utilized a hookup charge that varied with the horsepower
rating of the motor. This was combined with a single block or constant energy
charge per kwh of electricity consumed. The lowest energy charge of 1.826
cents per kwh represents the actual short-run marginal cost to Kit Carson
Electric of providing an additional kilowatt to the average farmer.
The five rate structures modeled are listed in Table 4 along with the
results. The structures varied from a hookup charge of $64.03 per horsepower
and energy charge of 1.826 cents per kwh to a zero hookup charge and 7.8 cents
per kwh. Thus, the marginal cost to a farmer of purchasing more power varied
with each rate structure, providing gradations in the incentive to conserve.
The rate structures each raise the same revenue for the utility if total irri-
gation sales of electricity remain constant. Figure 14 shows that the alter-
native rate structures are equal at the 107,000 kwh level of consumption which
is somewhat below full irrigation of the standard crop mix.
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Table 4. Experiment I: Forecasted Electricity Use, Water Use, and Net
Returns to Fixed Assets (per well) for Varying Hookup and Energy
Charge Combinations.
Rate Structure Acre Total FarmerFeet Total Average Electricity Net
¢/kwh $/HP Pumped kwh ¢/kwh Costa Returns b
1982 Electricity Prices
A 1.826¢ $64.03 244 136,710 6.5¢ $ 8,899 $22,329
B 5.35 26 247 133,080 7.3 9,720 21,804
C 6.2 17 248 130,710 7.5 9,804 21 ,589
0 6.86 10 252 122,020 7.7 9,371 21 ,475
E 7.8 0 252 122,020 7.8 9,518 21 ,328
2 x 1982 Electricity Prices
A 3.652 128.06 247 133,080 13.3 17,666 13,858
B 10.7 52 253 121,010 15.0 18, 148 12,616
C 12.4 34 253 121 ,010 15.2 18,405 12,359
0 13.72 20 247 117,050 15.4 18,059 12,210
E 15.6 0 246 105,160 15.6 16,404 12,084
2.5 x 1982 Electricity Prices
A 4.565 160.08 247 133,080 16.6 22,082 9,442
B 13.375 65 247 117,050 18.9 22,155 8,114
C 15.5 42.50 246 105,160 19.5 20,549 7,939
0 17.15 25 201 83,140 20.2 16,758 8,114
E 19.5 0 196 80,500 19.5 15,697 8,718
3 x 1982 Electricity Prices
A 5.478 192.09 247 133,080 19.9 26,499 5,025
B 16.05 79 244 104,050 23.5 24,499 3,811
C 18.6 51 196 80,500 24.9 20,073 4,342
0 20.58 30 185 75,270 24.6 18,491 4,891
E 23.4 0 153 58,060 23.4 13,586 6,018
3.5 x 1982 Electricity Prices
A 6.391 224.11 252 122,020 24.8 30,209 637
B 18.725 91 196 80,500 30.0 24,173 242
C 21 .7 59.50 164 64,820 30.9 20,017 1,152
0 24.01 35 153 58,060 30.0 17,440 2,164
E 27.3 0 100 40,170 27.3 10,967 4,229
4 x 1982 Electricity Prices
A 7.304 256.12 252 122,020 28.3 34,524 -3,679
B 21.4 104 164 64,820 37.4 24,272 -3,103
C 24.8 68 103 41 ,160 41.3 17,007 -1,553
0 27.44 40 100 40,170 36.5 15,023 173
E 31 .2 0 35 15,050 31 .2 4,694 3,241
~Total electricity cost to farmer equals utility revenue.









140,000 150,000120,00060,00040,00020,000a 80,000 100,000
kwh
































Each rate structure was incorporated into the linear programming model.
The results appear in Table 4. At 1982 electricity prices, none of the rate
structures deterred farmers from full irrigation. The decrease in power
consumption from 136,710 to 122,020 kilowatts is solely due to a shift from
high pressure to low pressure center pivot and gated pipe irrigation. The
marginal costs to the farmers varied from 1.8 cents to 7.8 cents per kwh,
all of which fall in an inelastic part of the demand curve.
Since the hookup and energy charge proportions did not substantially
affect irrigation at current price levels, electricity rates were increased
to determine if this aspect of rate structures would be important at higher
rate levels. Electricity prices were therefore increased by factors of 2,
2.5, 3, 3.5, and 4.
Farmer purchases of power, as shown in the kwh and acre feet columns
of Table 4, were affected more and more dramatically as electricity prices
increased. This was because the range of marginal costs became larger with
each price increase. Note that in every case rate structure A, with the
lowest marginal cost, allowed full irrigation. The effect on crop mix of
change to a zero hookup and higher energy charge rate structure became more
substantial with each price level increase. Doubling price to 15.6 cents
per kwh caused lower irrigation levels on some corn. The 2.5 and 3 times
1982 price levels brought in irrigated wheat. The 3.5 factor, 27.3 cents,
level eliminated corn from the crop mix. These changes are all related to
the breakeven prices described earlier.
Utility revenue was more affected by the hookup charge level than farm
income. Utility revenue, listed as total cost in Table 4, is fairly constant
at 1982 and doubled price levels. However, as the higher marginal cost rate
structures begin to induce conservation, utility revenues fall accordingly.
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The higher the marginal cost and the lower the hookup charge~ the more a
farmer can reduce power bills by conserving. Thus, conservation incentives
in this rate form come at the expense of utility revenue stability. This
point can be illustrated by referring back to Figure 14 and observing that
revenue drops much more quickly with rate structure E than with A. With no
hookup charge and a single block rate structure~ utilities are vulnerable to
revenue shortfalls from conservation efforts.
The alternative rate structures have a less consistent effect on farm
net income. Income falls slightly as marginal cost increases in the first
three price levels. However, at the prices 3, 3.5, and 4 times 1982 levels,
net income to farmers rises with marginal cost. An explanation is that the
low marginal cost allows more irrigation~ but the high hookup charge takes
away nearly all consumer surplus. High marginal costs cause less irrigation,
but the low hookup charge allows some consumer surplus to be preserved.
The net farm income in Table 4 needs to be compared to the income that
could be gained from dryland farming on the equivalent acreage, namely $2,530.
In the short run, farmers will switch to dry1and when net income falls below
this level. Thus~ at 3.5 and 4 times 1982 prices, farmers would only irrigate
with rate structure E and then only on the higher valued crops.
In the long run farmers must also have sufficient net income to pay the
$6~530 annual cost of irrigation system reinvestment. With this additional
expense, irrigation would cease in the long run with any rate structure except
A at the 2.5 times 1982 price level. One caveat to remember is that this
model represents aggregate irrigation of a crop mix. Irrigation of higher
valued crops such as sugar beets and pinto beans would continue after the bulk
of irrigated lands have converted back to dryland~ so long as the :prices of
these crops met the average of the 1977-81 period.
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Experiment II: Alternative Rate Structures
In this section the effect of alternative rate structures on electricity
demand, water use, and farm income . is tested by the model. This experiment
also serves to emphasize the importance of marginal cost as the rational
decision-making criterion for power purchases. The demand curve for electric-
ity was estimated earlier. By comparing the shape of demand with the marginal
cost curves of various rate structures, power consumption and utility revenues
can be estimated. Since electricity demand is quite inelastic at average
commodity prices, a broad range of alternative rate structures should yield
similar results.
The concept of a fixed hookup charge is not used here; all revenues are
considered to be collected by variable kwh charges. These rate structures
can, however, serve the same purpose as hookup charges by having some of the
first rate blocks exceed the utility1s short-run marginal cost. This takes
revenue from the consumer surplus to pay fixed costs.
Seven alternative rate structures were designed to provide approximately
the same revenue to the utility per well, that is, $9,500. Average commodity
prices were assumed in constructing the rate, though January 1982 commodity
prices were used in a subsequent test. The rate structures were all expected
to result in full irrigation despite their quite different forms.
The seven alternatives are listed in Table 5. Alternative 1 is reminis-
cent of that currently used by Y-W Electric Association. The second alternative
uses an even wider range of prices with more blocks. Its lowest block of 2
cents per kwh probably represents the low end of the range of feasible prices
as that charge approaches the short-run marginal cost of most REAs. Alternative
3 is similar to the first rate structure but shows a smaller range of prices.
The fourth and fifth alternatives are the simplest form of declining blocks.
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Alternative 4 has a more precipitous drop in price and is similar to the
K.C. Electric Association rate structure. The sixth alternative is an example
of increasing block rates, while the last alternative demonstrates a single
block form.
Table 5. Alternative Rate Structures for Experiment II.
Type Block Limits Charge per KWH
#1 Decl i ni ng Blocks First 2,000 KWH 25¢
Next 25,000 KWH 13¢
Next 25,000 KWH 10¢
Additional 4¢
#2 Declining Blocks First 10,000 KWH 30¢
Next 10,000 KWH 20¢
Next ,10,000 KWH 15¢
Next '10,000 KWH 10¢
Additional 2¢
#3 Declining Blocks First 25,000 KWH 12¢
Next 25,000 KWH 10¢
Next 25,000 KWH 8¢
Additional 4¢
#4 Declining Blocks First 50,000 KWH 16¢
Additional 2¢
#5 Declining Blocks First 50,000 KWH 9¢
Additional 6¢
#6 Increasing Blocks First 25,000 KWH 6¢
Next 25,000 KWH 7¢
Next 25,000 KWH 8¢
Next 25,000 KWH 9¢
Additional 10¢
#7 Single Block All KWH 7.8¢
Placing these seven alternative rate structures into the LP model produced
the results displayed in Table 6. When average commodity prices were used,
utility revenue or energy costs differed by less than 3 percent while net
farm revenues varied by less than 5 percent. All the rate structures allowed
full irrigation, though alternatives 6 and 7 used more surface irrigation to
save energy. The most striking result here is the lack of effect that the
choice of rate structure makes at average commodity prices.
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Table 6. Experiment II: Forecasted Electricity Use, Water Use, and Net
Returns to Fixed Assets for Alternative Rate Structures (per
well).
Total Farmer
Electricity Total Average Acre Feet Net
Rate Structure Costa KWH ¢/KWH Pumped Returnsb
Average Commodity Prices
1 $9,243 133,080 6.9¢ 247 $22,281
2 9,434 136,710 6.9 244 22,219
3 9,573 133,080 7.2 247 21 ,701
4 9,734 136,710 7. 1 244 21 ,919
5 9,343 130,720 7.1 248 22,051
6 9,601 121,010 7.9- 253 21 ,163
7 9,518 122,020 7.8 252 21,328
January 1982 Commodity Prices
1 $9,347 135,670 6.9¢ 251 $9,899
2 9,486 139,300 6.8 248 9,889
3 9,677 135,670 7. 1 251 9,569
4 9,786 139,300 7.0 248 9,589
5 9,640 135,670 7. 1 251 9,605
6 5,250 75,000 7.0 159 9,562
7 7,058 90,490 7.8 179 9,090
~Tota1 electricity cost to farmer equals utility revenue.
Returns to land, management, irrigation system, and water.
However, Table 6 shows that low commodity prices, such as those of January
1982, can make rate structure important. The five declining block alternatives
still provided nearly identical results. But with the increasing and single
block alternatives and their higher effective marginal costs, farmers would
be expected to reduce irrigation in response to low crop prices. This caused
sharply lower utility revenues, though net farm income fell only slightly. The
conversion of corn to wheat makes sense in terms of resource conservation,
though it reduces utility revenues. The reduction in feed grain production
would help crop price recovery while holding scarce Ogallala aquifer water for
later, possibly more valuable, uses.
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Experiment. III: Seasonal Rate Structures
The last experiment with the linear programming model incorporates
seasonal rate differentials. The wholesale supplier of power, Tri-State
Generation and Transmission, currently makes two different demand charges to
the Rural Electric Associations (REAs) in eastern Colorado. It charges
$10.99 for each kilowatt of peak demand. A further ratchet charge of $5.47
per kilowatt is assessed for the amount by which the summer-winter demand
difference exceeds the 1974 difference. .A kwh used in the peak month costs
far more than the 1.56l¢ energy charge that Tri-State also assesses. Thus,
REAs have a strong incentive to reduce the summer peak energy demand, which
is mostly due to irrigation.
Load Management
One way to encourage a lowering of the peak and to spread out energy
demands is to use a load management rate structure. This allows the power
utility to cut off an irrigation pump one or possibly two days a week.
Stopping irrigation on one-seventh of the wells each day should lower the
peak demand. Some REAs, such as Y.W. Electric and Highline Electric, give
rate discounts for farmers who sign up for this program. Given existing pump
capacity, no yield reductions are expected from this interrupted service.
Since REAs are non-profit cooperatives and any savings should be reflected
in lower rates, a well publicized voluntary program might be effective.
K.C. Electric claims to hav~ just that. However, a voluntary program dis-
tributes the cost savings to all consumers, not specifically to those who
endure the inconvenience. This reduces the incentive to participate in a
voluntary program. Due to the lack of costs associated with enrollment, we
did not assess load management discount rates with the computer model.
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Seasonal Rates with 1977-81 Prices: Experiment III-A
Instead, another peak load management option was examined. Seasonal
rates can move energy demands away from the peak period by offering lower
rates for non-peak use. Public utility rate theory imples that if capacity
must be built for part-time use to meet peak demands, then the peak demand
price should be the long-run marginal cost which includes incremental capa-
city costs while the off-peak price should be only short-run marginal cost
or operating costs. However, this policy would result in high peak prices
and very low off-peak prices. The large difference is very probably poli-
tically infeasible [Seagraves and Easter, 1982J, and we considered a less
stringent, more pragmatic, tack. To the extent that irrigation in the peak
period causes higher cost, such as demand and ratchet charges to the REA,
non-peak discounts promote more efficient resource use and should be encouraged.
In eastern Colorado peak usage occurs during June, July, and August.
The model was therefore adjusted to charge energy use the full rate during
these months, while giving a discount to pumping in April, May, and September.
Since wheat can be irrigated in these months, this seasonal rate structure
provides a cost advantage for this crop .
. Discounts of 10, 20, and 30 percent were given to off-peak irrigation.
In addition, five of the alternative rate structures used in the previous
section were retained here (see Table 5). This provides a variety of marginal
energy costs to the farmer both before and after discounting.
The model was first run using the average crop prices (Experiment III-A).
However, the seasonal rate caused no change in the crop mix even with a 30
percent discount. At average commodity prices and up to 30 percent discount,
the profit advantage of corn is apparently too great to be overcome.
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Seasonal Rates with 1982 Prices: Experiment 111-B
The model was rerun with January 1982 crop prices. The results appear
in Table 7. Here relative crop prices are such that wheat is grown under
the increasing and single block rates (Alternatives 6 and 7) even without
a seasonal discount. This continues with the 10 and 20 percent discounts,
but at 30 percent, with declining block rate (Alternative 5), a conversion
to wheat also occurs. When wheat is grown, energy use and utility revenues
drop sharply. However, net farm income remains roughly the same or is even
higher with irrigated wheat than with corn. This shows that at current farm
prices, seasonal rate structures:could conserve both water and peak period
energy, while maintaining the economic viability of farming in the region.
Significant reductions in supplier revenues would be associated with such a
policy.
To summarize, relati.ve crop pr t ces seem to qenerally outweigh the cost
advantages given by seasonal rate structures. However, there are combinations
of commodity prices and discount rates where the encouragement of more effi-
cient resource use will cause a conversion to crops with more off-peak water
and energy demands.
An important option which this project was unable to explore is that
seasonal rates could cause the promotion of new irrigation timings for con-
ventional crops. Colorado State University irrigation specialist Don Miles
has proposed using large early irrigations to fill the soil profile with
moisture within the potential root zone. This approach could allow later
irrigations to be foregone, reducing peak summer demands [Miles, 1977J.
Irrigation load management with interruptable service and seasonal
rates are compatible. Load management should be encouraged either through
a strong voluntary program or with rate discounts. Off-peak energy rates
46
Table 7. Experiment II1-B: Forecasted Electricity Use, Water Use, and Net
Returns to Fixed Resources (per well) for Seasonal Rate Structure
with January 1982 Crop Prices.
Total Farmer
Energy Total Average Acre Feet Net
Rate Structure Costa kwh ¢/kwh Pumped Returnsb
No Discount
3 $9,677 135,670 7.1 ¢ 251 $ 9,569
4 9,786 139,300 7.0 248 9,589
5 9,640 135,670 7.1 251 9,605
6 5,250 75,000 7.0 159 9,562
7 7,058 90,490 7.8 179 9,090
10% Discount
3 9,592 135,670 7.0 251 9,654
4 9,742 139,300 7.0 248 9,633
5 9,513 135,670 7.0 251 9,733
6 5,250 78,830 6.7 156 9,864
7 6,787 90,490 7.5 179 9,362
20% Discount
3 9,507 135,670 7.0 251 9,739
4 9,698 139,300 7.0 248 9,677
5 9,385 135,670 6.9 251 9,861
6 5,250 82,440 6.4 163 10, 185
7 6,515 90,490 7.2 179 9,,634
30% Discount
3 9,422 135,670 6.9 251 9,824
4 9,654 139,300 6.9 248 9,721
5 3,360 51,300 6.5 99 9,312
6 5,250 85,860 6.1 170 10,488
7 6,244 90,490 6.9 179 9,905
~Total electricity cost to farmer equals utility revenue.
Returns to land, management, irrigation system, and water.
should also be discounted to the extent the marginal cost to the utility of
off-peak energy is lower. Even if the seasonal rate does not cause any change
in farm resource use at first, it may be important to have seasonal rates in
place to provide the incentive for more efficient resource allocation when
economic conditions warrant.
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EVALUATION OF EXISTING RATE STRUCTURES
Given the results of this research and the economic principles applicable
to rate design, an evaluation can now be made of the current electricity rate
structures employed by the REAs of eastern Colorado and their wholesale
suppliers. This evaluation contains some subjective judgements reflecting
the authors' views. In particular, we advocate a rate structure based on
long run marginal cost of electricity supply. The current understanding of
LRMC pricing focuses on the amount of future resources used or saved by user
decisions (Munasinghe and Warford, '982). This contrasts with the traditional
approach, which is concerned with historical or sunk cost recovery. Prices
that reflect the true economic cost of supplying the users needs permits
supply and demand to be matched efficiently.
Long run marginal cost pricing satisfies the equity principle in that
costs are charged to users according to the burden they impose on the system.
(The equity or fairness concept calling for provision of minimum service levels
to those who cannot afford fuel costs class not appear to be relevant in the
present case of irrigated agriculture.)
Pricing according to the LRML criteria will also raise sufficient
revenue to meet the system's financial requirements, though some connection
charges may be needed in the case of economies of scale.
Finally, a forward looking LRMC rate scheme - one based on future rather
than historical costs - would serve as an inhibatory force on excess water
withdrawals and thereby work toward preserving the limited water supply.
Wholesale Rates
Some comments on the wholesale rates are appropriate first since they
are a major influence and constraint in the de~ign of- REA rates (see Table 8).
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Table 8. Wholesale and Retail Rate Structures for Electricity, Colorado High
Plains, 1983
WHOLESALE RATes
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association
Energy Charge
Demand Charge
Ratchet Charge for Peak Demand







Load Management Irrigation Rate
Energy Charge
Minimum Charge














Subject to control on pre-determined day/week
Subject to control during all peak periods















































































Tri-State Generation and Trasmission charges a relatively low rate of 1.561
cents per kwh for energy while assessing substantial demand and peak demand
charges. A peak demand charge is based on the cost of providing capacity for
peak use. While the energy charge may reflect short-run marginal costs and
allocate supplies efficiently in the near term, it will tend to encourage
premature expansion as system capacity is approached. A low energy charge
at the wholesale level allows REAs to have similarly low final blocks in their
rate structures. This structure does not effectively discourage consumption,
and from a state policy viewpoint it neglects the user cost of Ogallala
water. It is the authors' belief that charging for the short-run marginal
.ccst does not provide an accurate signal in the market, because it does not
contain the full opportunity cost of providing capacity. This opportunity
cost is the average cost of adding to or replacing capacity in the present;
it is not average historical costs incurred in the past. (See Saunders,
Warford, and Mann, 1977 for further detail.) Tri-State's pricing policy is
perhaps appropriate, however, given their current excess capacity.
Colorado Ute Electric is at the other extreme of wholesale pricing. As
our- research confirmed, single block charge provides considerable encouragement
to conserve energy. However, Colorado Ute might consider combining its
average cost pricing with some sort of peak demand charge in order to reflect
the opportunity cost of expanding system capacity.
Retail Rates
At the retail level, Table 9 compares the charges each REA would make
to the owner of a lOO-horsepower pump in 1982 under different levels of
consumption and with different rate categories. Strict comparisons are
inappropriate due to the different cost structures of each REA. However, it
is instructive to examine the discounts given by load management and winter
rates. This table also shows that the rate structures with the higher marginal
Table 9. REA Irri9ation Charges Under Varying Rate Structures and Levels of ConsumptionEJ
Number of Kilowatts Consumed in Season
REA Rate 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000
y-w Summer $4,723 $6,157 $6,997 $7,837 $8,677
K.C. Summer 6,015 7,498 7,863 8,228 8,593
K.C. Old Summer 4,920 6,080 7,240 8,400 9,560
Highline Summer 4,380 5,700 6,648 7,596 8,544
S.E. Colorado Summer 3,347 4,963 6,578 8,194 9,809
Y-~'J Load Management 4,607 5,609 6,449 7,289 8,129
Highline Load Management 7% 4,073 5,301 6,183 7,064 7,946
Highline Load Management 14% 3,767 4,902 5,717 6,533 7,348
y-w Wi nter 4,427 5,267 6,107 6,947 7,787 U10
Highline Winter 2,492 3,738 4,984 6,230 7,476
S.E. Colorado Wi nter 3,019 4,307 5,594 6,882 8,169
~Assuming 100 hp pump motor.
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rates have a much greater variation in total cost between small and large levels
of purchase. For example, compare the Highline and K.C. summer rates. Both
make nearly the same charge at the 120,000 kwh level, but Highline gives a much
larger saving for reducing consumption.
The rate structure that charges high marginal cost gives farmers more
flexibility in irrigation decisions by not discriminating against low irriga-
tion levels. In constrast, power suppliers may fear this variation in revenue
and its effect on debt repayment capacity. Therein lies the crux of the
problem. Incentives for conservation and more efficient resource use come at
the expense of greater variability and large potential reductions in utility
revenue. Revenue problems are further exacerbated by the requirements that
the cooperatives REAs refund excess revenues each year. This eliminates the
possibility of averaging surpluses and shortfalls over the years.
The effect of a minimum charge is to make the rate structure up to the
minimum charge nearly irrelevant. Since the minimum charge must be paid if
any power is to be purchased, the kilowatt hours allowed by the minimum payment
have a marginal cost of zero. For example, Y-Wls charge of $1,575 for 100
horsepower attaches a zero marginal cost to the first 11,568 kwh. This causes
inefficient resource allocation for anyone who would otherwise use less than
that amount. While this may be unlikely we consider a minimum charge to be
inessential to an effective rate structure. Less ambiguous charging techniques
are either a hookup charge or a higher than marginal cost initial rate block
that most irrigators will exceed.
For Y-W Electric the minimum charge renders the initial block of 1000
kwh an unnecessary complication. An improvement would be to drop that block
and raise the level of the next block slightly. The minimum charge could
probably be dropped at little risk since the vast majority of irrigators will
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exceed that level of consumption. Y-W's load management rate is made by
shortening the length of the early, more expensive, blocks. This means that
the discount is all obtained once an irrigator progresses past 50,000 kwh
in the cheapest block. Yet the benefits to the utility of load management
may continue beyond this level. This feature might be changed so that the
farmer is rewarded at any level of consumption. Highline Electric's percent-
age discount is an example.
The same lack of proportional savings applies to Y-W's winter rates .
Shortening the early block of a rate structure is also more difficult to
understand than a percentage discount on the rate. Farmers may not see the
savings or the connection between peak and off-season billing. Since off-
season electricity use actually costs the utility less, this rate should be
lower. Y-W does not give as great a proportional discount as either Highline
or S.E. Colorado Power. The Y-W winter rate does, however, define a short
enough peak season as to make the off-season rate practical for use.
In 1982 K.C. Electric Association tried a declining block rate structure
rather than its historical use of a single block with hookup charge. The lack
of a minimum charge with the declining blocks is unique among the REAs examined.
This change in rate form significantly lowers the incentive to conserve
electricity and, indirectly, water. The final block rate is a low 1.826
cents per kwh. Farmers have little reason to reduce energy or water use
once the final block has been reached at 50,000 kwh. Its old rate structure
had a hookup charge to provide some secure revenue for fixed costs, yet kept
the energy charge at a level high enough to provide significant savings to
conservation efforts.
Table 8 shows that Highline Electric uses a declining block rate struc-
ture with a final block of 4.74 cents per kwh. Its rather large minimum
charge may rt mpi nge on the irrigation choices of . some farmers, especially
since its northeastern Colorado service area contains more shallow wells.
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The load management discounts Highline offers are unambiguous and easy to
administer. Similarly, the Highline single block winter rate is laudable,
but the long peak season makes use of the winter rate difficult.
A final and interesting case is that of Southeast Colorado Power. Its
rate structure, at first glance, appears to be the best in terms of economic
efficiency. The use of two blocks, the first slightly higher to cover
administrative costs, yet both probably near the level of long-run marginal
cost, provide an accurate signal to consumers of the cost of additional consump-
tion. The second block varies with the season, smoothly integrating differential
rates into one rate structure. The only problem is that the summer season
might be shortened to make the winter rates more effective.
It is ironic that the S.E. Colorado Power rate structure provides the
most encouragement to energy conservation. This REA is in the unfortunate
situation of having high fixed costs from recent distribution system invest-
ments. With declining water tables, irrigation pumping near the economic
margin, and a wholesale rate that has no peak charge added to the picture,
S.E. Colorado Power faces the quandary of having a revenue shortfall lead to
a rate increase which in turn causes even less irrigation and still lower
revenues. S.E. Colorado Power might be one of the rare cases where declining
blocks make sense. It cannot afford to set high marginal prices because
they have been all too effective in getting farmers to reduce irrigation.
When the base load is reduced, the high fixed costs can only force another
increase in rates. So a declining block irrigation rate to maintain a stable
level of consumption might be appropriate here until the debt load has been




Economic theory reveals that in order to maximize profits from crop
production, farmers must match the price of an additional unit of electricity
with the marginal value product of the use of that energy in irrigation. The
important price is that mf the last unit consumed. Assessing agricultural
demand for energy provides a perception of the flexibility available in designing
rates. Also of importance is the cost of producing electricity. The marginal
price applicable to farmers should reflect the cost of supplying the energy
if resource use is to be efficient.
A linear programming model was used in this ':st udy to estimate the demand
for electricity and pump irrigation water and to analyze the effects of various
rate structures on farm resource allocation and inoome. The model was formu-
lated to derive the most profitable operation of a typical irrigation well
and quarter-section in eastern Colorado. Seventy-four crop growing options
were available including six crops, three to four levels of irrigation, and
three irrigation technologies. From the results of this research several
points can be made in summary.
1. Crop prices are more important than electricity rate structures in
determining the feasibility of irrigation and the most profitable crop mix.
Electricity for pumping irrigation water is but one of many inputs needed for
crop production. If a crop is much more profitable than the next best
alternative, then it will likely remain in production no matter what the rate
structure. However, when crop prices fall, lowering profit margins as well,
rate structure can be a significant factor in farm management decisions.
2. With five-year average commodity prices, the demand curves estimated
by the model for both electricity and water are highly inelastic within the
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relevant electricity price range. However, demand approaches unitary elasti-
city as corn shifts to irrigated wheat at electricity prices greater than 15
cents per kwh. Short-run breakeven electricity rates range from over 60 cents
per kwh for pinto beans to 12.5 cents per kwh for alfalfa.
3. When January 1982 crop prices apply, price elasticities exceeding
2.0 occur in the 7 to 9 cent per kwh range. Farmers can be expected to react
to electricity prices in this range by growing irrigated wheat to conserve
energy and water. Careful planning is therefore required by the utilities
to accomodate declines in electricity usage. If crop prices return to pre-PIK
program levels, this portion of the analysis will have the most relevance to
utilities and regulatory agencies.
4. Varying the proportions between hookup and energy charges has little
effect on irrigation under average crop prices until electricity prices are
more than double the 1982 average cost. Then higher energy charges and lower
hookup charges encourage conservation. Farm income remains stable with con-
version to less energyintensi:ve crops, but this comes at the expense of
utility revenues. High hookup charges stablize utility revenue but can en-
courage excessive use of electricity and water.
5. As might be expected, given the inelastic demand, alternative rate
structures do not affect farm irrigation decisions if five-year average crop
prices prevail. A variety of declining block, increasing block, and single
block rate structures with a broad range of marginal prices all yielded
predictions of full irrigation and approximately the same revenues to both
farmer and utility. Under the 1982 crop price assumption, the single block
and increasing block rate structures did cause reduced irrigation.
6. This study found that the effects of seasonal rate structures in
encouraging off-peak irrigation were outweighed by relative crop prices.
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However, possible innovations in irrigation scheduling were not analyzed in
this report. Seasonal rate structures are recommended to the extent that
off-peak power is less costly. They provide an incentive to farmers in favor
of spreading out their demand for electricity.
7. Although the model was .'r,un in this study for the area around Burlington,
Colorado, the results can be extended, with some modification, to other
irrigated areas of the state. In northeastern Colorado and espettally the
alluvial wells of the South Platte Valley, the demand for electricity and
water will be higher than those found here for any given commodity price
scenario. This is due to lower pump lifts, and it means that northeastern
Colorado farms will tend to be less sensitive to rate structure changes. On
the other hand, the demand curves of southeastern Colorado should lie inside
those of the Burlington area due to deeper wells and higher evapotranspiration
rates. This should lower crop profit margins and make southeastern Colorado
irrigation more sensitive to electricity rates.
Limitations of the Study
In interpreting the results of this study several caveats need to be
repeated. One important consideration is that this report has relied ex-
clusively on partial analysis. That is to say that only one variable in the
model has been manipulated while all others were held constant. In reality,
all market prices, and thus farmer decisions, are interconnected. For instance,
low commodity prices would eventually cause the use of less fertilizer and other
inputs. Another possibility is that substantial shifts in the crop mix could
reverberate through the market to cause crop price changes. A major shift
from corn to wheat production, for example, would put downward pressure on
the price of wheat while allowing corn prices to rise.
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The model employed in the study also allowed some shifting between irri-
gation systems, which would only happen with considerable cost. While this
cost was not incorporated into the model, the results are not believed to be
substantially altered by this factor. Major shifts in irrigation systems
were constrained in the model. Additionally, the most common switch was
from high pressure to low pressure center pivot, which only requires different
spray nozzles, and is not expensive.
Finally, these results must be used with care because the response would
likely change with different economic conditions or in another geographic
area. However, this type of linear programming model could be a valuable tool
for utility planners to test ideas for specific rate structures. Once budgets
are prepared for each crop enterprise, the model can be easily updated to
current prices and adapted to a wide variety of rate structures or situations.
Conclusion
Rate structures which charge higher marginal prices for electricity
provide farmers with more flexibility in their irrigation decisions in the
form of greater rewards for reduced irrigation. In contrast, power suppliers
must be concerned about this potential variation in revenue and its effect
on their debt repayment capacity. Therein lies the anu~ of the problem facing
rate policy-makers. The criteria of efficiency and revenue requirements
conflict. If utility revenues decline along with energy use, utilities may
have to incre~se thei~ charge~ per kwh in order to meet fixed costs. The
farmers' IIreward" for conserving energy could thus be a rate increase. This
vicious circle is a particular dilemma to those utilities who have recently
increased capacity and updated distribution systems at considerable cost in
mistaken anticipation of a continued expansion of irrigation.
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Revenue problems are further exacerbated by the federal regulation re-
quiring that Rural Electric Associations (REAs) refund excess revenues each
year. The occasional shortfalls that tend to occur naturally from variations
in the weather cannot be absorbed from periods of surplus. Permission for
the utilities to retain a reserve fund to smooth out revenue fluctuations
might reduce their need to collect a large part of their revenues by fixed
charges.
In general, REAs in eastern Colorado continue to use declining block rate
structures in a time when pump irrigation no longer needs to be encouraged.
Declining block rates and large hookup charges provide revenue stability for
the utility, by monetizing some of the consumers' surrlus on inframarginal
units of electricity. .This revenue stability comes at the ' expense of mini-
mizing the incentive to conserve and use resources efficiently. A scenario
of continued full irrigation of traditional crops with conventional technology,
leading to an earlier depletion of the Ogallala aquifer, is thus ·promoted.
One way to prolong irrigation in eastern Coloradb is to implement
electricity rates which reflect both the higher incremental costs of energy
and the increasing scarcity of water in the declining Ogallala aquifer. An
increasing block rate structure which ends at long-run marginal cost deserves
serious consideration in those portions of the region which are expected to
experience growing electricity demand. (Randall, 1981:12; Hanke, 1972:292-295;
Turvey,1971:73:) The lower first block could be used to avoid a revenue
surplus and to offer a minimum amount of irrigation at a nominal price.
The final block's price would contain all costs of expanding capacity and
thus provide an accurate market signal to farmers of the cost of additional
consumption.
If increasing blocks are not used~ then allowing REAs to average irri-
gation revenue over several years would ameliorate the conflict between allo-
cative efficiency and revenue requirements in rate structure design. This
would lower the need for hookup charges and high initial rate blocks and
allow the use of single block or very gradually declining block rates.
In the interest of meeting the goal of rate stability, a change
to inverted blocks or a single block may require one or more temporary in-
cremental moves towards higher marginal prices for electricity. A well
publicized and orderly rate structure shift . over several years would minimize
effects on past investments.
Unfortunately~ little or no work seems to have been done on optimal
pricing under decreasing demand. The established literature on public
util ity pricing tends to deal with the more conventional case of growing
demand for the product (Saunders~ Warford~ and Mann~ 1977; Hanke~ 1972;
Munasinghe and Warford~lg82). Deep~ning wells, impending aquifer depletion,
and ~ncreasing power costs are reducing the profitability of irrigation from
the Ogallala aquifer. In fact~ irrigated acreage in eastern Colorado is
forecasted to decline by 40 percent by the year 2020 (Young, et al., 1982).
Yet the fixed costs of REAs must still be recovered if they are to avoid
default on debt. Discount pricing through declining blocks or two-parts
tariffs like hookup charges can encourage continued full irrigation and thus~
debt recovery at the cost nf hastier aquifer depletion. An alternative more
in tune with regional economic goals is to attempt to recover costs over a
longer period with reduced irrigatinn levels. Restructuring.of loans may be
possible, since the federal Rural Electrification Administr.ation furnished
much of the investment capital for local REAs. We beli~ve these broader
concerns should be increasingly recognized in rate-making policy.
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APPENDIX I
Partial Linear Programming Tableau for Evaluating Electricity Rate
Structures on Eastern Colorado Irrigated Agriculture
Definitions
Rows
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION - Maximizes returns to land, management, water and the
irrigation system
KWH - Kilowatt hours
ELCOST - A special ordered set consisting of columns ENTRY through POINT4
GPWATER - Acre inches of water pumped into a gated pipe irrigation system
LPWATER - Acre inches of water pumped into a low pressure center pivot system
HPWATER - Acre inches of water pumped into a high pressure center pivot system
Input Purchase Activities
RBYDSL - Gallons of diesel fuel purchased
RBYGAS - Gallons of gasoline purchased
RBYNH3 - Pounds of anhydrous ammonia purchased and applied
RBYFER - Pounds of other fertilizer purchased and applied
RNPWC - Non-power water costs that vary per acre inch
Crop Selling Activities
RSLCG - Bushels of corn grain sold (similar activities exist in the full
tableau for sugar beets, pinto beans, wheat, sorghum, and alfalfa hay)
Land Constraints
IRRLND - Acres of irrigated land
GPLND - Acres of gated pipe irrigation
LPLND - Acres of low pressure center pivot irrigation
HPLND - Acres of high pressure center pivot irrigation
BTLND - Acres of sugar beets grown
BNLND - Acres of pinto beans grown
Pumping Constraints
PUMAPR, PUMMAY, PUMJUN, PUMJUL, PUMAUG, and PUMSEP constrain the amount of
water used in each month of the growing season to the amount that can be
physically pumped by the average well.
Columns
ENTRY, POINTO, POINT1, POINT2, POINT3, and POINT4 describe the total cost and
total number of kilowatt hours purchased at the end of each block of the rate
structure.
GPW, LPW, AND HPW show the number of kilowatt hours needed to pump one acre
inch of water through gated pipe, low and high pressure center pivot systems.
CBYDSL, CBYGAS, CBYNH3, CBYFER, and CNPWC give the purchase price for each
of the inputs.
CSLCG gives the selling price for corn grain. Similar columns exist in the
full tableau for the other crops.
CG = corn grain
GP = gated pipe irrigation
LP = low pressure center pivot irrigation
HP = high pressure center pivot irrigation
F = full irrigation level
5 = five-sixths 6f full irrigation
2 = two-thirds of full irrigation
= one-third of full irrigation
DRY = dryland crop production
Similar crop activities exist in the full tableau for sugar beets, pinto beans,
wheat, grain sorghum, and alfalfa hay.
















CBYDSL CBYGAS CBYNH3 CBYFER CNPWC CSLCGHPWLPWGPWRows Unit Entry POINTO POINTl POINT2 POINT3 POINT4
Objective $ 0 -1 ,575 - 1,575 - 3,379 - 5,579 - 9,737Function























~ppendix Table 1. (continued)
Rows Unit CGGPF CGGP5 CGGP2 CGGPl .CGLPF CGLP5 CGLP2 CGLPl CHGPF CGHP5 CGHP2 CGHPl CGDRY RHS
Objective $ -123.00 -122.00 -121.57 -118.61 -100.62 -100.00 - 99.05 -96.27 -100.62 -100.00 - 99.05 -96.27 -28.82 MAXFunction
KWH Kwh =0
ELCOST =1
GPWATER ac in 26 22 18 9 <0
LPWATER ac in 23 20 16 8 ~O
HPWATER ac in 23 20 16 8 <0
RBYDSl gal. 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 3.3 =0
RBYGAS gal. 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.2 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.2 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.2 0.4 =0
RBYNH3 lb. 200 190 180 100 200 190 180 100 200 190 180 100 25 =0
RBYFER lb. 150 140 135 75 150 140 135 75 150 140 135 75 25 =0
RNPWC ac in 26 22 18 9 23 20 16 8 23 20 19 8 =0
RSLCG bu. 130 122 110 65 130 122 110 65 130 122 110 65 10 =0
IRRLND acre 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 <128
GPLND acre 1 1 1 1 <64
LPLND acre 1 1 1 1 <64
HPLND acre 1 1 1 1 >32
BTLND acre <7
BNLND acre ~7
PUMAPR ac in 4 3 3 3.5 3 3 3.5 3 3 <1379
PUMMAY ac in 3 2 2 <1379
PUMJUN ac tn 5 4 4 3 4.5 4 3 2 4.5 4 3 2 <1379
PUMJUL ac in 9 8 7 3 8 7 6 4 8 7 6 4 <1379
PUMAUG ac in 8 7 4 7 6 4 7 6 4 2.1379
PUMSEP ac in <1379
APPENDIX II
Derivation of "Breakeven" Prices
Example - One acre of corn grown with low pressure center pivot at the
full irrigation level with January 1982 commodity prices
Gross Revenue (130 bushels x $2.50)
Cost of Machinery, Labor, Seed,







Remaining Revenue (returns to land, management, irrigation
system, and water)
Kilowatt Hours Required (23 acre inches x 40.82 kwh/ac in)
Short-Run "Breakeven" Rate ($133.94/939 kwh)
Irrigation System Cost
Management Cost (.06 x $325.00)
Remaining Revenue (return 'to land and water)
Long-Run "Breakeven" Rate ($63.44/939 kwh)
$325.00
100.62
10. 12
3.02
26.00
22.50
13. 11
15.69
191 .06
133.94
939 kwh
l4.3¢
$51.00
19.50
$70.50
$63.44
6.8¢
